We study how the structure of housing …nance a¤ects the transmission of monetary policy shocks. We document three main facts: …rst, the features of residential mortgage markets di¤ers markedly across industrialized countries; second, and according to a wide range of indicators, the transmission of monetary policy shocks to residential investment and house prices is signi…cantly stronger in those countries with larger ‡exibility/development of mortgage markets; third, the transmission to consumption is stronger only in those countries where mortgage equity release is common and mortgage contracts are predominantly of the variable-rate type. We build a two-sector DSGE model with price stickiness and collateral constraints and analyze how the response of consumption and residential investment to monetary policy shocks is a¤ected by alternative values of two institutional features: (i) down-payment rate; (ii) interest rate mortgage structure (variable vs. …xed rate). In line with our empirical evidence, the sensitivity of both variables to monetary policy shocks increases with lower values of (i), and is larger under a variable-rate mortgage structure.
Introduction
The role of housing wealth on economic activity has recently attracted considerable attention among academic researchers, policy-makers and press commentators. 1 This paper studies the relationship between the structure of housing …nance and the monetary transmission mechanism in several industrialized countries. We …rst show that there is signi…cant heterogeneity in the institutional characteristics of national mortgage markets across the main industrialized countries, and especially within the EU. Examples of such institutional characteristics include the typical duration of mortgage contracts, the required levels of down-payment (or inverse loan-to-value ratios), the existence (or lack thereof) of equity release products. We interpret these indicators as alternative measures of the degree of development/ ‡exibility of mortgage markets. There is in fact one channel, working from housing …nance to the macroeconomy, that we aim at capturing by means of these indicators: the extent to which mortgage contracts allow to translate the value of housing as a collateral into current availability of credit for households. In turn, this credit can be used not only to …nance new housing expenditure but also (non-housing)
consumption.
In addition to the aforementioned indicators we also classify countries according to the prevailing interest-rate structure of mortgage contracts, namely ‡exible vs. …xed interest rate contracts. We treat this indicator separately for it does not necessarily re ‡ect a higher 1 or lower degree of development of mortgage markets. 2 We believe this channel may be particularly important for the transmission of monetary policy, especially on consumption,
for it represents a direct channel through which monetary policy, by altering the service cost of debt, can a¤ect current disposable income.
We then conduct a VAR-based analysis of the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks on consumption, house prices and residential investment in a sample of industrialised countries. We classify the countries into two groups, according to their degree of development of mortgage markets. Those belonging to the …rst (second) group are countries where LTV ratios are low, mortgage equity release is common (absent or partial) and the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP is high (low). We then also classify countries according to their prevailing interest rate structure of mortgage contracts (…xed vs. variable rate).
We …nd two main results. First, the size of the peak e¤ect of a monetary policy shock on residential investment is positively and signi…cantly related both to our indicators of ‡exibility in mortgage markets (with higher ‡exibility translating into larger sensitivity)
and to the type of interest rate structure (with residential investment being signi…cantly more responsive to policy innovations in those countries with a variable-rate mortgage structure). A similar pattern emerges for the response of house prices. Second, we …nd that the evidence for consumption is mixed. Namely, consumption is signi…cantly more responsive only in those countries where mortgage equity release is common and, especially, where prevailing mortgage contracts are of the variable rate type. Other indicators of mortgage markets ‡exibility, such as the LTV ratio or the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP, turn out not to be relevant for the di¤erential response of consumption across countries to monetary innovations.
Under frictionless …nancial markets, the structure of housing …nance should in principle be immaterial for the e¤ects of monetary shocks. To rationalize our evidence we build a model that extends the baseline monetary policy framework in three main directions. 3 First, it allows for two sectors, respectively producing consumption goods and new housing. Second, it features heterogeneity of preferences between impatient consumers and patient consumers (in equilibrium, borrowers and savers respectively). The former do not act as standard permanent-income agents, but exhibit preferences tilted towards current consumption. The borrowers may be thought of as that share of the population for which acquiring a loan/mortgage requires providing an asset, and housing in particular, as a form of collateral. Third, private borrowing is constrained by the value of the collateral.
That value is endogenously tied to the evolution of the price of housing.
Thus, in a context where mortgage markets allow more easily to convert asset values into borrowing, and therefore spending, consumption and residential investment should be more responsive to underlying shocks. In our framework, the relevant institutional features of the mortgage market are summarized by two main parameters: (i) the down-payment rate, and (ii) the interest-rate structure of the contract. We calibrate and simulate the model based on our introductory evidence on the heterogenous characteristics of mortgage markets in industrialized countries. We …nd that both institutional features magnify the responses of consumption and residential investment to monetary policy shocks.
General equilibrium borrower-saver models build on the earlier analysis of Kiyotaki and Moore (KM) (1997) and Krusell and Smith (1998 to a real business cycle framework and explore the role of credit market innovations in contributing to the so-called Great Moderation. The modelling section of our work is related to the former paper, but it di¤ers in two main ingredients: …rst, it features a two-sector structure (so that residential investment is an endogenous variable); second, it models institutional characteristics of the mortgage market (such as variable vs. …xed-rate contracts) and analyzes how they shape the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we document some key institutional di¤erences in mortgage markets across industrialized countries. We conduct some VARbased empirical analysis in Section 3, focussing on the impact of a monetary policy shock on housing market-related variables. The structural model is developed in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents some dynamic simulations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Housing …nance in the industrialized countries
In this section we document that mortgage markets di¤er signi…cantly across industrialized countries in terms of both size and key institutional characteristics, such as the prevailing contractual arrangements and the available product range. This heterogeneity is particularly evident within the euro area, where mortgage lending remains a predominantly domestic business activity, largely re ‡ecting national traditions and cultural factors as well as the institutional settings of the local banking sector. The indicators included in Table 1 are: (i) mortgage-debt to GDP ratio; (ii) typical LTV ratio; (iii) type of interest-rate structure; (iv) typical mortgage contract duration, (v) di¤usion of home equity release products, and (vi) the IMF (2008) index of mortgage market development and completeness.
Cross-country heterogeneity is pervasive in all indicators considered. Mortgage-to-GDP ratios vary widely across countries: values range between 13% in Italy and 116%
in Switzerland. Among the large countries, Italy and France have the lowest ratios, while the ratios in the UK and the US are relatively high. Also typical LTV ratios vary signi…cantly across countries, ranging between 50% in Italy and 90% in the Netherlands and UK. 4 Cross-country variations in these ratios partly re ‡ect di¤erences in legal and regulatory frameworks. 5 Hence, they re ‡ect -at least to some extent -institutional factors which are largely exogenous.
The heterogeneity in terms of interest rate adjustment is also substantial across coun-tries. Conceptually, mortgage contracts can be distinguished between variable and …xed rate mortgages: variable rate contracts are those in which the lending rate ‡oats with, or is frequently adjusted to, a short-term market interest rate; …xed rate contracts are those in which the lending rate remains constant throughout the duration of the contract.
In practice, contracts do not always fully conform to these conceptual types and often fall under intermediate categories (Borio 1996) . Among the EU countries, the UK, Spain and Italy mainly have variable or adjustable rate mortgages, although for the latter two countries this re ‡ects a relatively recent development. 6 By contrast, Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands are mainly characterized by …xed rate mortgages, similar to the US and Canada.
An additional element of divergence among national mortgage markets is the extent of the recourse to home equity release. Following changes in house prices and mortgage interest rates, collateral constrained agents may wish to adjust their net borrowing positions or to re…nance the terms of their existing mortgages according to the changed conditions. For instance, in light of a run-up in house prices (and especially if that run-up is expected to continue into the future), borrowers may increase the amount of their mortgage loans or apply for a second mortgage against the increased value of their collateral.
The released mortgage equity may be subsequently used for a variety of purposes, such as debt re…nancing, acquisition of durable goods, purchase of …nancial assets or home improvements. When mortgage interest rates decrease, agents may be willing to re-…nance their mortgages to take advantage of lower interest payments in order to free liquidity for other expenditures or, alternatively, they may want to increase their borrowing to re ‡ect their increased debt servicing capacity. Alternatively, and mostly in countries with highly ‡exible and developed mortgage markets, lenders may be more willing to extend so-called home equity lines of credit (or, broadly speaking, home equity loans) when they observe an increase in house prices. Conversely, during a downturn in house prices, as in the recent …nancial turmoil, such equity lines of credit are often the …rst ones to be scaled back by lenders. At the same time, in those instances, lenders may …nd it convenient to walk away from delinquent home equity loans rather than pushing borrowers into foreclosure on the primary mortgage. 7 All these margins are likely to have signi…cant consequences on 6 Japan also has mainly variable rate mortgages. 7 See, for instance, Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2008.
5 current disposable income, and therefore on current consumption for liquidity constrained individuals.
Overall, the use of home equity release remains limited in some countries as reported in tries at a time of (common) worldwide low interest rates has seemed to provide further con…rmation about the importance of structural di¤erences in mortgage markets across countries in determining the strength of the housing channel of monetary policy.
In this section we estimate a baseline VAR model in 19 advanced countries for which we have su¢ ciently reliable house price data. 9 The model is speci…ed as follows,
for each country i and time t; z t is a vector of common exogenous variables. The vector of the endogenous variables, Y i t , includes (in this order) private consumption, residential investment, the consumer price index (CPI), the real house price, a 3-month interbank interest rate, and the real e¤ective exchange rate. We include the real e¤ective exchange rate to cater for open economy in ‡uences that, while arguably secondary for the US economy, are likely to matter considerably for the small open economies in our group of countries. Moreover, for all countries except the US we include up to 2 lags of the US log consumption, the US log price level, the US 3-month interest rate and the oil price in USD as exogenous variables; for the US, we only include the last variable. The exogenous variables are a parsimonious way to cater for cross-country spillovers and in fact we …nd that the correlations between residuals in country pairs are typically very small. The identi…cation of the VAR is achieved by assuming that the A i 0 matrix has a Choleski structure in each country. 10 The model in (1) is estimated on quarterly data, seasonally adjusted whenever appropriate, on a sample period between 1980:1 and 2008:4. For two countries, the starting date is later due to data availability (1981 for Switzerland, 1988 for Austria). 11 The VAR models are speci…ed in levels and, with the exception of the interest rates, all variables are in expressed in logs. Based on the Schwartz information criterion, a lag order of two (in levels) is found to be optimal for this model across almost all countries.
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After estimating the VAR model for each country, we run the pooling test (based on a Wald test of equal coe¢ cients) to check whether a panel speci…cation with pooled cross sections could be preferable. However, we …nd that the data overwhelmingly reject the null that the coe¢ cients in model (1) are the same across countries. 13 Therefore, rather than estimating a pooled panel which would in this case likely lead to biased estimates, we estimate the model country-by-country and then consider the average impulse response of the endogenous variables to a standardised contractionary monetary policy shock (i.e., 10 See, for instance, Christiano et al. (1999) . Our results are not sensitive to alternative orderings of the variables: for instance, whether consumption is ordered before or after residential investment (although it may seem plausible that residential investment reacts more quickly to monetary impulses than real consumption), the house price ordered before or after the CPI, or the real exchange rate ordered before or after the short-term nominal interest rate. 11 Notice that, due to data limitations, we have not included another possibly relevant variable in the VARs, i.e., mortgage debt. Also, the lack of harmonized data on house prices has to be emphasized; even within the euro area house price data are not fully comparable. For this reason, the results on house prices have to be interpreted with relatively more caution. 12 Giuliodori (2004) conducts a similar analysis for EU countries, …nding broadly similar results as in this study. (WHAT WE DO THAT HE DOES NOT DO)a shock of the same magnitude to the equation for the 3-month interest rate).
We aggregate the cross-sectional information based on the 'stochastic pooling'Bayesian approach proposed by Canova and Pappa (2007) . Let dX i (k) be the estimated impulse response (to a unit size monetary policy shock) of variable X at horizon k for country i.
Similar to Canova and Pappa 14 , we assume that the prior distribution is
where k is the cross-country average and
x ; x > 0, represents the assumed degree of dispersion across countries for each variable X. We choose x so as to allow for a signi…cant degree of dispersion across units. The dispersion across countries decays over time at a rate dictated by the parameter x . 15 We choose a very di¤use prior for k ; so that the average impulse responses are practically entirely driven by the data. As shown by Canova and Pappa, the posterior mean for ki.e. the variable which we are interested in in our analysis -is a weighted average of the OLS estimates across countries, with weights given by the precision of the estimates, i.e.
the inverse of their variances; the posterior precision is also a linear combination of the x parameters as well as the weighted precision of the OLS estimates. Since the posterior distribution for k is Normal, we can plot ranges at various signi…cance levels. Figure 1 reports the group average impulse responses of the CPI, private consumption, the real e¤ective exchange rate, residential investment and the real house price to a monetary policy shock. The impulse responses generally accord well with the conventional wisdom on the e¤ects of a monetary policy shock. Private consumption, residential investment fall temporarily after the shock in the usual hump-shaped manner, and ultimately go back to the baseline. The e¤ect on residential investment is, in average, quicker and about ten times larger at the peak than the e¤ect on private consumption, a result which has been already emphasised in the literature, especially on US data (see e.g. Erceg and Levin, 2006) . In addition, real house prices fall in response to the shock, with this response also displaying an inertial behavior. Finally, the CPI falls over time (though displaying a price puzzle in the short term), and the real e¤ective exchange rate appreciates.
We then turn to the key objective of this analysis, namely establishing whether the transmission of monetary policy shocks is di¤erent across countries according to the degree of development in their mortgage markets. In order to shed some light on this question we divide the full group of 19 countries in two sub-groups according to several indicators of mortgage market development. First, we rank the countries according to their mortgage debt to GDP ratio and to the typical LTV ratio. In this way, we classify countries below the median country in the ranking as "low development" countries, and the remaining ones as "high development". As to the ability of engaging in mortgage re…nancing and mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW), we divide the countries between those where this is possible (high development) and those where this is not possible (low development).
Finally, we classify countries according to whether their mortgage debt structure is predominantly …xed rate or variable rate. Table 2 reports the chosen classi…cation for all countries in our group. We choose to report results for a classi…cation based on alternative indicators for this should arguably increase the robustness of our results.
Based on this classi…cation of the countries in 2 sub-groups, we then study whether the transmission of a monetary policy shock is signi…cantly di¤erent across sub-groups. We therefore compute the average impulse response to a standardised monetary policy in the sub-groups, using the same 'stochastic pooling'approach used before the whole group of countries within each sub-group. These are reported in Figure 2 for private consumption, Figure 3 for residential investment and Figure 4 for the real house price (standard errors are again computed based on the bootstrapping procedure described above). The thick, blue lines refer to countries with highly developed mortgage markets, and the thin, purple line to countries with less developed markets. The general message is that there appears to be a strong di¤erence between the two sub-groups as regards the response of the housing market-related variables, namely residential investment and the real house price. This is particularly evident for two institutional parameters: the possibility of mortgage re…nancing and MEW, and the interest rate adjustment (…xed or variable). Overall, there is signi…cant evidence that monetary policy exerts more powerful e¤ects on housing markets in countries where the underlying mortgage market is more developed (according to our classi…cation), and mortgages are mostly of the variable rate type. As regards consumption, the results are more mixed. On the one hand, countries where MEW is practiced and where the interest rate adjustment is predominantly variable rate continue to show a signi…cantly stronger impact of monetary policy on private consumption as well.
On the other hand, the results for the loan to value ratio index and for the mortgage debt to GDP ratio do not show any signi…cant e¤ect.
POSSIBLE COMMENT ON OUTLIERS??
In order to formally test for the statistical signi…cance of the di¤erences in the mean impulse responses across the sub-groups, Table 3 reports such di¤erences for consumption, residential investment and the real house price at 4, 8, 12 and 24 quarters ahead, together with a formal test of statistical signi…cance, again derived using a bootstrapping procedure. Each entry in the upper panel of Table 3 reports dX(k) low dX(k) high or dX(k) f ix dX(k) var , where, respectively, "low" and "high" stands for highly and lowly developed mortgage markets (with the degree of development measured across di¤erent indicators), and "…x" and "var" for …xed rate and variable rate contracts respectively. In the lower panel of Table 3 the same values are reported for accumulated impulse response functions. As can be seen in the Table, most of the di¤erences between sub-group mean responses are negatively signed and often statistically signi…cant, which -given the ordering of the two sub-groups -shows that on the whole monetary policy is relatively more powerful in countries with more developed mortgage markets and variable rate mortgages.
We have also investigated whether cross country di¤erences in monetary policy transmission can be equally detected, in particular for the variables related to the housing market, by looking at alternative indicators of …nancial and economic structure. For …nancial structure, we look at (i) stock market capitalisation over GDP; (ii) ratio of total liquid liabilities over GDP; (iii) ratio of total private credit over GDP; for economic structure, we look at economic size, trade openness and share of industry over total value added. We repeat the same procedure as reported for the mortgage market development measures, dividing the total list of countries in two sub-groups of 'highs'and 'lows'(results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors upon request). The only variable which we …nd to be consistently correlated with the size of the response of 11 residential investment and the real house price to a monetary policy shock is stock market capitalisation over GDP, which is an indicator of overall …nancial development. 16 Two observations are relevant at this stage. First, a more structural investigation of the link between mortgage markets characteristics and the transmission of monetary policy shocks requires a theoretical framework. Second, the fact that private spending is more responsive to monetary impulses in economies with more developed credit/mortgage markets, at least according to some indicators, may be perceived as a puzzle. In principle, in a standard representative-agent model of the monetary transmission with free borrowing and lending, the structure of credit/mortgage markets should be immaterial for the e¤ects of policy. In addition, a priori, one may believe that more developed …nancial markets would allow households to smooth consumption more e¢ ciently, whereas our results point to a larger variability of consumption, at least conditional on monetary policy shocks.
In the following, we present a model in which a fraction of agents, in equilibrium, do not choose to behave as permanent-income consumers. Rather, for these agents, it is optimal to increase their borrowing in light of any given rise in income. Their access to credit is constrained by an endogenously determined limit. Thus, in a context where credit markets allow to convert asset values (e.g., housing) into borrowing and therefore consumption more easily, consumption itself should be in principle more responsive to underlying shocks. We describe our model in the next section.
The model
The economy is composed of a continuum of households in the interval (0; 1). As in Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) , there are two groups of households, named borrowers and savers, that we assume of measure ! and 1 ! respectively. Each group of households is endowed with one unit of time, so that an individual borrower and an individual saver are endowed with a fraction 1=! and 1=1 ! respectively. There are also two sectors, producing (non-durable) consumption goods and new housing respectively. In each sector there are competitive producers of a …nal good and monopolistic competitive producers of intermediate goods, with the latter hiring labour from both the borrowers and the savers. The two types of households feature heterogeneous preferences, 16 citation needed with the borrowers being more impatient than the savers, implying that their marginal utility of consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving. 17 Both borrowers and savers derive utility from consumption of the non-durable …nal good and from housing services.
Notice that debt accumulation re ‡ects intertemporal equilibrium trading between the two agents. Borrowers are subject to a collateral constraint, with the borrowing limit tied to the value of the existing stock of housing.
Final good producers
In each sector (j = c; h) a perfectly competitive …nal good producer purchases Y j;t (i) units of intermediate good i. The …nal good producer in sector j operates the production function: 
for all i. In particular, P j;t R 1 0
1 " j is the price index consistent with the …nal good producer in sector j earning zero pro…ts. 18 
Borrowers
A typical borrower consumes an index of consumption services of housing and non-durable …nal goods, de…ned as: 17 For previous examples of saver-borrower models, see Becker (1980) , Becker and Foias (1987) , Krusell and Smith (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . 18 Hence the problem of the …nal good producer j is: max P j;t Y j;t R 1 0 P j;t (i)Y j;t (i)di subject to (4).
where C t denotes (non-durable) consumption services, H t denotes the stock of housing at the end of period t, > 0 is the share of housing in the composite consumption index, and > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing. 19 The borrower maximizes the following utility program:
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms):
where I h;t H t (1 )H t 1 is residential investment, B t is end-of-period t net nominal debt, and R m t 1 is the nominal lending rate on debt contracts stipulated at time t 1 with maturity m. Furthermore, W j;t is the nominal wage earned by the borrower in sector j (with j = c; h), and N j;t is total hours supplied in sector j. Finally T t are net nominal government transfers.
In real terms (units of non-durable consumption), (8) reads
where q t P h;t =P c;t is the relative price of housing, and b t B t =P c;t is real debt. Notice that, as a consequence of debt being predetermined in nominal terms, variations in in ‡ation a¤ect the real ex-post cost of debt service, and therefore borrower's net worth.
Later we will work with the utility speci…cation:
19 To de…ne a utility-based aggregate price index one needs to assume the existence of an additional …nal good producer, whose task consists in assembling housing and consumption services via the production function (6) . The price index consistent with maximization of pro…ts by this producer would read:
where ' is the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply and v j is a scale parameter. 20 Variable vs. Fixed-Rate Contracts The interest rate R m t on a mortgage contract of maturity m is related to the policy rates R t+k (k = 0; 1; 2:::) via the term-structure equation:
with 2 [0; 1].
In the case m = 1 the mortgage and the policy rate coincide. Mortgage contracts are typically multi-period. Multi-period loan contracts can be de…ned as at variable rate (i.e., contracts tied to the short-term policy rate), or at …xed rate (tied to a long-term interest rate) depending on the value of . For = 0 the mortgage rate is perfectly indexed to the policy rate, while for = 1 it is …xed to the m-period interest rate. We assume that the decision on who bears the interest rate risk (either the borrower or the saver) mainly re ‡ects institutional factors which lie outside the scope of our model.
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Collateral Constraint Private borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. At any time t, the amount that the borrower agrees to repay in the following period, R t B t , is tied to the expected future value of the housing stock (after depreciation):
where is the fraction of the housing value that cannot be used as a collateral. This type of constraint can be justi…ed on the basis of limited enforcement. 22 Since the borrower can run away with the assets in case of default, requiring a collateral ex-ante acts against that temptation. At the margin, the larger the expected realized value of the asset prevailing 20 Notice that each household is assumed to derive independent disutility from work in each sector. As a result, the nominal wage will not be equalized across sectors. This form of labor market segmentation is useful to dampen the substitution e¤ect across sectors in response to relative price movements, which would otherwise tend to generate a counterfactual negative sectoral co-movement in response to aggregate monetary shocks. 21 See Campbell and Cocco (2003) for a normative analysis of the optimal choice between a variable-rate and a …xed-rate mortgage contract based on household-level risk management. 22 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kocherlakota (2000) .
at the time of the loan repayment (i.e., t + 1), the larger is the lender's willingness to extend credit in the current period. The reason is that in the event of default in time t + 1 the lender will be able to seize an asset whose value has increased over time. In this vein, an expected future housing appreciation contributes to expand the ability to borrow in the current period.
One can think of parameter as the down-payment rate (or inverse LTV ratio) required at the beginning of the loan contract (time t), therefore representing a direct measure of the ‡exibility of the mortgage market (Jappelli and Pagano 1989). As already discussed above, the value of may re ‡ect legal and regulatory constraints changing across countries (see Table 1 ). Notice, though, that loan contracts extend for one period in our environment. Hence parameter can be broadly interpreted as measuring the ability of extracting equity from the value of the house during the life span of the mortgage:
in other words, it can be interpreted also as a measure of mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW), or of the willingness by lenders to extend home equity lines of credit. 23 Given initial values fb 1 , H 1 g, the borrower chooses fN j;t ; b t ; H t ; C t g to maximize (7) subject to (9) and (12) . By de…ning t and t t as the multipliers on constraints (9) and (12) respectively, and U x;t as the marginal utility of variable x = C; N j ; H, e¢ ciency conditions for the above program read:
U n j ;t U c;t = W j;t P c;t j = c; h (13)
q t U c;t = U h;t + (1 )E t fU c;t+1 q t+1 g + (1 ) (1 )U c;t q t t E t f h;t+1 g (15) 23 Technically speaking a measure of MEW should be based on the realized di¤erence between the current value of the house and the debt principal still due, rather than be based on the expected realized market value of the house. The results, however, would not be qualitatively altered in our setting if we were to adopt the former speci…cation.
Interpretation
Equations (13) governs the consumption/leisure margin in each sector, while (14) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of the ‡ow budget constraint (8) . Equation (15) is an intertemporal condition driving the choice between housing and consumption. It requires the borrower to equate the marginal utility of current consumption (left-hand side) to the marginal gain of housing services (right-hand side).
The latter depends on three components: (i) the direct utility gain of an additional unit of housing; (ii) the expected utility of expanding future consumption by means of the realized resale value of a new unit of housing purchased in the previous period; (iii) the marginal utility stemming from the possibility of using housing in the form of collateral.
Notice that the latter component (which is critical in our analysis) is proportional to the shadow value of borrowing t , with that component disappearing when t = 0, i.e., when the collateral constraint is not binding.
Equation (16) Integrating both (15) and (16) forward, and combining, we can express the margin between consumption and housing in more compact form as:
where
The above equation illustrates the channel linking housing collateral and consumption.
The right hand-side of (17) has two components, V t and t . The …rst is the present discounted value of the current and future marginal utility of housing. Given that the stock- ‡ow ratio of housing is extremely high, V t behaves very smoothly in response to shocks, and especially if those shocks are temporary in nature as monetary policy ones.
Intuitively, the marginal increment in utility of a new unit of housing is small relatively to the stock. Notice that under perfect capital markets V t would be the only component of the marginal utility of housing. The second term on the right hand side of (17), t , depends on current and future values of the shadow value of borrowing t . Monetary policy has a direct e¤ect on t by altering the cost of servicing the debt, and therefore the shadow value of borrowing.
Next consider equation (17): if V t is quasi constant, and even in the case of purely ‡exible prices in both sectors (so that the relative price q t is constant in response to aggregate shocks), any e¤ect on the shadow value of borrowing will a¤ect the marginal utility of consumption. Suppose monetary policy tightens: this will generate a rise in the current and future values of t , and therefore a rise in t . In turn, via (17) , this will raise the marginal utility consumption and, in equilibrium, generate a fall in consumption. In addition, movements in the relative price of housing help to strengthen this channel: for instance, if the current and future real price of housing falls, the value of collateral shrinks proportionally, thereby a¤ecting current borrowing and consumption.
Savers
We assume that the savers are the owners of the monopolistic …rms in each sector. A typical saver maximizes the utility program
Importantly, the discount rate is such that > . The saver's sequence of budget constraints reads (in nominal terms): (20) where f W j;t is the nominal wage rate paid to the saver in sector j, and e j;t are nominal pro…ts from the holding of monopolistic competitive …rms in sector j.
E¢ ciency conditions for the saver's program read:
c;t+1
The interpretation of the above e¢ ciency conditions is standard. In fact, those conditions can be derived as a particular case of (13), (14), and (15) when t = 0 for all t, and = .
Production and pricing of intermediate goods
Intermediate-good …rm i in sector j hires labor to operate the following production function:
where L j;t (i) is total labor employed by …rm i in sector j.
Each …rm i has monopolistic power in the production of its own variety and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In so doing it faces a quadratic cost proportional to output, and equal to:
where the parameter # j measures the degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity. The higher # j , the more sluggish the adjustment of nominal prices in sector j. For # j = 0 prices are ‡exible.
The problem of each monopolistic …rm is to choose the sequence fN j;t (i), P j;t (i)g 1 t=0
to maximize expected discounted nominal pro…ts:
subject to (24) . In (26), j;t E t n e t+1 = e t o is the saver's stochastic discount factor, and e t is the saver's marginal utility of nominal income.
Let's denote by P j;t (i)=P j;t the relative price of variety i in sector j. In a symmetric equilibrium in which P j;t (i)=P j;t = 1 for all i and j, and all …rms employ the same amount of labor in each sector, the …rst order condition of the above problem reads:
where j;t P j;t =P j;t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate in sector j, and mc j;t is the real marginal cost in sector j.
Optimal choice of the labor input implies that the real marginal cost in sector j reads:
Finally, sectoral in ‡ation and relative prices are related as follows:
Market clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j = c; h requires that the production of the …nal good be allocated to total households'expenditure and to resource costs originating from the adjustment of prices:
Equilibrium in the debt and labor market requires respectively
Monetary policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function, constrained to be linear in the logs of the relevant arguments:
where R t is the short-term policy rate, and t is a policy shock evolving as:
with u t~i :i:d:,with mean zero and variance 2 u . Our baseline assumption is to employ a version of (34) in which j;t = c;t , although the results will not be sensitive to specifying rules in which the in ‡ation index is the CPI.
21
Relative to a standard monetary NK framework with perfect …nancial markets, monetary policy works via three novel channels in this framework. Although these channels are interrelated, it is helpful, for expositional purposes, to consider them distinctively.
Consider a monetary policy contraction, in the form of an interest rate hike: …rst, this produces a fall in in ‡ation and therefore a rise in the real service cost of debt, which is predetermined in nominal terms at time t. This e¤ect is akin to a negative income e¤ect via the borrower's budget constraint. We feature this as an independent channel because it would be at work also in the absence of a collateral constraint.
Second, the policy tightening works via the collateral constraint. The rise in the nominal interest rate induces a rise in the shadow value of borrowing both directly (via a mechanical fall in debt B t in equation 12) and indirectly, via a heightened future service cost of debt. The rise in the shadow value of borrowing, in turn, induces a fall in consumption via the channel described in equation (17) .
Finally, movements in the real price of housing q t also a¤ect the transmission of monetary policy shocks, by a¤ecting the (expected) value of the housing stock that can be used as a collateral. Fluctuations in that value a¤ect the tightness of the collateral constraint.
In our two-sector model, however, this e¤ect is operative only in the case of asymmetric price stickiness. With prices ‡exible or equally sticky in both sectors, in fact, real house prices would remain unchanged in response to a monetary policy shock. Under our baseline assumption that house prices are ‡exible and non-durable prices sticky, however, a policy tightening will induce a fall in the real house price, thereby inducing (all else equal) a depreciation of the collateral value and a further tightening of the collateral constraint.
In turn, this will induce a fall in the demand for borrowing, and therefore a fall in the demand for housing, which will further depress its relative price, all in a self-reinforcing fashion. In this respect, this asset price channel works by strengthening the collateral channel. In equation (17) , in fact, a fall in q t requires an even larger increase in the marginal utility of consumption in order to match any given variation in the tightness of the collateral constraint represented by the right-hand side of (17) .
This interpretation of the channels at work clari…es the role of the institutional features of mortgage markets. First, a lower value of , representing a more ‡exible/developed mortgage market, implies that a larger variation in consumption is needed to satisfy (17) for any given variation in t (i.e., for any given impact on the tightness of the collateral constraint). Intuitively, in light of a policy tightening, a more ‡exible mortgage market entails that credit to households will be reduced more rapidly, with this e¤ect translating proportionally into a variation in consumption. Second, any given variation of the shortterm interest rate will be passed-through to mortgage rates more rapidly if the structure of mortgage contracts is at variable rate. This pass-through e¤ect, in turn, will be larger in those economies with low mortgage contracts.
Dynamic simulations
In this section we evaluate the transmission of monetary policy shocks. We begin by illustrating how the role of borrowers and of a collateral constraint alter the equilibrium dynamics relative to a baseline NK model. We then analyze how the transmission of monetary policy shocks is a¤ected by two key institutional features: (i) the down-payment rate ; (ii) the interest-rate mortgage structure (…xed vs. variable debt contract)
Calibration
We resort to the following calibration. Time is in quarters. We set the quarterly discount factor = 0:99 > = 0:98. The annual real interest rate is pinned down by the saver's patience rate and is equal to 4%. The annual physical depreciation rate for housing is generally low, and around 1% per year. Therefore we set = 0:01=4 as a baseline value.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties is set to 7:5 in both sectors, which yields a steady-state mark-up of 20%.
We assume throughout that house prices are ‡exible. This assumption is not without controversy. For one, as argued in Barsky et al. (2007) , house prices, unlike consumption prices, are largely subject to negotiation upon transactions, so it could be plausible that they are relatively more ‡exible. At the same time, there is evidence that house prices are subject to a large degree of predictability (see Glaeser and Gyourko 2007), both upward and downward. Our results, however, do not hinge critically on this assumption.
We set the stickiness parameter for consumer prices equal to a benchmark value of # c = 75. To pin down this value we proceed as follows. Let be the probability of 
The current share of housing and housing-related expenditure is about 10% on average in the euro area. However, by adding owner-occupied housing that number would increase to 17.5%. Since we do not have rents in the model, we calibrate the share in order to match the expenditure for owner-occupied housing. The latter value is estimated as being 7.5% in the euro area and 24% in the US, although statistical methodologies di¤er substantially. We choose to pick an intermediate value of = 16%. The down-payment rate is set at = 0:3 in the baseline calibration, a value which is close to the euro area average, corresponding to a LTV ratio of about 0:7 (see Table 1 ). Below, however, we experiment with alternative values of this parameter. As to monetary policy, we set the Taylor rule parameters = 1:5 and r = 0, and the persistence of the monetary policy innovation r = 0:7. Throughout we assume that (i) durable prices are ‡exible;
(ii) the elasticity of substitution equals 1 (which implies Cobb-Douglas preferences in consumption and housing services); (iii) the monetary policy rule features a reaction to consumption price in ‡ation. 24 
The role of the collateral constraint
We begin by describing the general features of the monetary transmission in our setup. In this exercise, we set the share of borrowers to a baseline value of ! = 0:5. Notice, …rst, that the monetary policy tightening induces a rise in the shadow value of borrowing 24 All our results do not hinge on these assumptions in any signi…cant way.
t . This in turn induces a contractionary e¤ect on borrower's consumption (collateralconstraint e¤ect). Since house prices are ‡exible (and consumption prices sticky), the policy tightening induces also a fall in the real house price q t , which in turn reduces directly the collateral value, further contributing to a tightening of the borrowing conditions (assetprice e¤ect). As a result, real household debt falls, the demand for housing services drops on impact and then starts to gradually revert back towards the steady state.
To better understand why, despite prices being ‡exible in that sector, the demand for housing services and therefore residential investment both fall, it is useful to notice that a policy tightening increases the user cost of housing. The user cost is the key intertemporal price that drives the relative demand of housing vs. consumption. Condition (15) requires the marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption, U h;t =U c;t , to be equated to the user cost (Z t ), which in this case reads:
The user cost depends positively on the current relative price of housing but inversely on the future price. Intuitively, expected capital gains on the holding of housing decrease the current user cost. A typical feature of the model with a collateral constraint is that the user cost depends not only on the dynamic of q t but also on the shadow value of borrowing t . In particular, one can show that a rise in the shadow value of borrowing generally induces a rise in the user cost. 25 The …gure makes clear that, under a collateral constraint, ‡uctuations in the shadow value of borrowing overwhelmingly drive the user cost. As a result, a policy tightening induces a rise in the user cost, a fall in the relative demand for housing services, and a fall in residential investment.
The …gure shows also the response of consumption by a typical saver (dashed lines).
Recall that the savers are standard permanent-income agents. Two competing e¤ects drive their demand. For one, a positive income shock, which is the counterpart of the negative income shock for the borrowers. This e¤ect leads the savers to increase both consumption and housing services. However, the rise in the real interest rate makes them substitute consumption intertemporally, so that, on balance, savers'consumption is less responsive than borrowers' consumption. At the same time, since the relative price of housing falls, the savers increase their demand for housing services. For these agents, in 25 See Monacelli (2008) for an analysis on this point referred to durable goods consumption.
fact, the relevant user cost of housing is the one prevailing in the absence of any collateral constraint, and therefore it depends heavily on the behavior of the (intratemporal) relative price of housing q t (and not on t ).
6.2.1 Varying the down-payment rate and the interest rate structure Figure 6 depicts the e¤ect on aggregate consumption and residential investment of varying the down-payment rate . We continue to assume a variable interest-rate mortgage structure. We consider three cases for : 0:05, 0:1, 0:3. This range of values approximately spans the gap between LTV ratios that have been common in the US in the last few years (arguably before the onset of the …nancial crisis) and average European ones.
Two results stand out. First, as in the data, the response of residential investment is signi…cantly larger than the one of consumption. Intuitively, each household tries, in response to the policy shock, to smooth the response of both consumption and the housing stock. Given that the stock- ‡ow ratio of housing is particularly high, the elasticity of residential investment (i.e., of the housing expenditure ‡ow) to interest rate changes is particularly high. Second, the response of both variables is ampli…ed by a smaller downpayment rate. As suggested above, a lower down-payment rate increases, all else equal, the sensitivity of borrowing to changes in the value of the collateral. A more rapid contraction of borrowing leads to a more rapid contraction of both consumption and housing services, and in turn of residential investment. Figure 7 displays the e¤ect of varying the interest-rate mortgage structure (which, in practice, corresponds to the degree of interest rate pass-through). We analyze two cases. The …rst case considers a debt structure in which the mortgage rate is freely linked to the short-term policy rate (variable rate, R m t = R t for all t, or alternatively = 0 in equation (11)). The second case is a limit case of a …xed-rate mortgage structure. This is approximated by considering the variant of the term structure equation (11) for ! 1, with maturity m extending to a limit case of an in…nite number of periods. In each case, we compare the e¤ect of varying the interest rate structure under alternative values of parameter . We wish to highlight, in fact, that also the interaction of di¤erent institutional characteristics of the mortgage market is potentially relevant.
When the down-payment rate is low ( = 0:05, upper panel), a variable rate contract structure signi…cantly ampli…es the responses of both consumption and residential invest-26 ment relative to the …xed rate case. When the down-payment is high, though, ( = 0:3, upper panel) the e¤ect of moving from a …xed to a variable rate structure is signi…cantly dampened. Intuitively, even if the pass-through from policy rates to mortgage rates is high (as under variable rate contracts) when the ability to borrow remains limited because of low LTV ratios, the interest rate structure of the mortgage matters relatively less. 26 Notice, however, that in all cases a …xed-rate structure does not necessarily imply that consumption is unresponsive on impact. In this case, a policy tightening is still generating both a nominal-debt and a collateral-constraint e¤ect (via a fall in the relative price of housing, which in turn depresses borrowing capability). With real house prices returning back to baseline, then, the e¤ect on consumption is quickly reversed in the case of a …xed-rate mortgage structure, whereas it continues to persist under a variable rate structure.
Conclusions
We have studied the role of housing …nance for the transmission of monetary policy on consumption, residential investment and house prices in a sample of industrialized countries. We have provided evidence that, according to a wide set of indicators, such structure varies signi…cantly across industrialized countries. We have then shown that residential investment and house prices are usually more responsive to policy shocks in those countries with more developed/ ‡exible mortgage markets. As for consumption, it is really two indicators that matter: the possibility (or lack thereof) of mortgage equity release and the prevailing interest rate structure of mortgage contracts. We have then built a DSGE model of the monetary transmission with three non-standard features: (i) two sectors; (ii) heterogeneity in patience rates; (iii) a collateral constraint on borrowing. We have shown that the response of consumption and residential investment to monetary policy shocks is a¤ected by alternative values of two institutional parameters of mortgage markets: the down-payment rate, and the interest-rate mortgage structure (variable vs. …xed interest rate). In particular, the model can rationalize the evidence that private consumption is more responsive to monetary impulses in economies with more developed/ ‡exible mortgage markets, somewhat in contrast with the presumption that more developed mortgage (credit) markets should be conducive to more e¢ cient consumption-smoothing.
There are several issues that have remained unexplored in this work and that it would be interesting to pursue in future research. First, providing a full estimation of the model. 27 Second, introducing an endogenous choice by the households between variable and …xed-rate mortgage contracts. Third, studying how the optimal conduct of monetary policy varies according to the characteristics of mortgage markets, and in particular in the context of a currency area (such as the euro area) in which the heterogeneity of mortgage market institutions remains widespread. 27 Iacoviello and Neri (2008) is an interesting step in this direction. Debelle (2004) , Girouard and Blöndal (2001) , Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) , Seko (1994) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) . Interest rate adjustment
28
Note: See text for further explanations. The same VAR model is estimated country-by-country over the sample period 1980:Q1 to 2008:Q4 (or closest depending on data availability in each country). The full group of 19 countries is split approximately in half where each country is classified as having a "high developed" or "low developed" mortgage market according to the ranking in the four considered indicators. In particular, countries with (i) relatively higher (lower) loan to value ratio, (ii) where mortgage equity withdrawal is (is not) allowed, (iii) with relatively higher (lower) mortgage to GDP ratio and (iv) where the interest rate adjustment is predominantly variable rate (fixed rate) are classified as high (low) mortgage market developed countries. The thin black line refers to low development countries, the thick red line to high development countries. In each subgroup the same stochastic pooling approach is applied to obtain group-mean posterior distributions.
